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ABSTRACT: Taking advantage of the mandatory disclosure of detected corporate tax 
evasions in China, we examine why publicly listed firms evade taxes. Different from most 
prior studies that focus on corporate income tax avoidance, we consider tax evasions related 
to both income taxes and non-income taxes. We also use a bivariate probit model to account 
for the partial observability of corporate tax evasion. Many of our regression results using the 
bivariate probit model are different from the results using the reduced form probit model that 
ignores the partial observability of tax evasion. Many of our results are also different from 
those of prior research on the determinants of corporate tax avoidance using the traditional 
effective tax rate as a proxy for tax avoidance.  
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1. Introduction 
 Corporate tax evasion, the most egregious form of corporate tax avoidance, is a 
worldwide problem. The lost revenues resulting from tax evasion are substantial. Slemrod 
(2007) estimates that the overall U.S. gross tax gap estimate is $345 billion in 2005, which 
amounts to 16.3 percent of estimated actual (paid plus unpaid) tax liability. The U.S. Internal 
Service Revenue (IRS) estimate that the tax gap increases to 458 billion per year between 
2008 through 2010. (Internal Revenue Service 2016).1 In the U.K., the National Audit Office 
reports that the HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) loses £16 billion a year due to tax fraud, 
an amount that is nearly half of HMRC’s estimate of the tax gap of £32 billion (National 
Audit Office 2015). Fisman and Wei (2004) also document indirect evidence of chinese 
firms’ tax evasion based on the discrepancy between Hong Kong’s reported exports to China 
and China’s reported imports from Hong Kong. Tax evasion could also cause significant 
horizontal inequity and efficiency losses, resulting in taxpayers’ distrust in a nation’s tax 
system (Feldstein 1999; 2008).  
 Despite the importance of corporate tax evasion to a variety of stakeholders, there is 
only limited empirical research on why firms evade taxes for two important reasons. First, 
there is little publicly available data on corporate tax evasion in most countries. For example, 
in the U.S. tax examinations are performed in secrecy and firms are not publicly identified 
even when they are charged with tax deficiencies under the IRS audit (Graham and Tucker 
(2006). Corporate disclosure of tax-related events is voluntary in nature and thus exhibits 
substantial cross-sectional variation in terms of completeness. For example, Gleason and 
Mills (2002) find that firms often fail to disclose IRS claims for tax deficiencies. Blouin, 
Gleason, Mills, and Sikes (2010) find that not all firms disclose the dollar value of a tax 
                                                          
1 Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock (2016) document that the corporate effective tax rates for U.S. firms 
over the past 25 years have decreased significantly, which cannot be explained by changes in firm 
characteristics and declining foreign statutory tax rates. 
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settlement. In the case of a large tax payment recorded on a firm’s financial statements, the 
firm is often not forthcoming about the reasons (Bauer and Klassen 2014). 
 Second, many corporate tax evasion activities remain undetected due to their inherent 
secrecy or inadequate enforcement by the resources-constrained tax authority. Hence, the 
observed tax evasion cases could represent the tip of the iceberg (referred to as the partial 
observability problem) and it is econometrically challenging to model the determinants of 
corporate tax evasion using only observed tax evasion cases.   
 To better understand the economics of corporate tax evasion, the objective of this 
study is to examine why publicly listed Chinese firms evade taxes. We focus on China 
because publicly listed Chinese firms have been mandated to disclose all detected tax 
evasions via tax adjustments in their annual reports since 2002. To deal with the partial 
observability of corporate tax evasion, we use a bivariate probit model to simultaneously 
model the determinants of corporate tax evasion (referred to as the commitment model) and 
the determinants of corporate tax evasion detection conditional on the occurrence of a tax 
evasion (referred to as the detection model).  
 Unlike most prior research that focuses on corporate income tax avoidance only, we 
consider both income tax evasion and non-income tax evasion together. Considering non-
income tax evasion is important because in many countries such as China, non-income taxes 
(e.g., value added taxes) constitute a significant portion of the total corporate tax payment.2 
Moreover, as we show in Table 2, approximately 60% of the detected corporate tax evasions 
in China are non-income tax related. Hence, omitting non-income tax evasions would 
significantly underestimate the degree of corporate tax evasion in China. 
 With regard to our commitment model, we use the motivation-ability-opportunity 
framework from the criminology literature to select our causal explanatory variables. 
                                                          
2 Using the information provided by China’s Tax Yearbook for the most available year 2012, we find that 
corporate income taxes (value added taxes) constitute approximately 21% (39%) of the total tax payment 
excluding individual income taxes.  
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Specifically, we use the following proxies for a firm’s tax evasion incentives, including 
ownership structure (i.e., SOEs vs. non-SOEs), capital structure, corporate tax rate, and 
external product market competition. We use firm size and accounting profitability to proxy 
for a firm’s tax evasion ability. We use several proxies for tax evasion opportunity, including 
firm growth, external auditor quality, past tax enforcement intensity, and overall provincial 
law enforcement quality. While we attempt to develop distinctive proxies for each of the 
three theoretical constructs, we wish to emphasize that some of the empirical proxies could 
represent more than one construct and therefore their coefficients should be interpreted with 
caution.  
 We consider two types of explanatory variables for the detection model. First, we 
consider incentive factors that may facilitate or impede the detection of tax evasion, including 
ownership structure, external auditor quality, local law enforcement quality, and public 
pressure. Second, we examine the impact of the tax authority’s enforcement effort on 
detection. 
 With regard to the commitment model, we find evidence consistent with the 
motivation-ability-opportunity framework. While many explanatory variables are significant, 
we wish to highlight the following three key results. First, past tax enforcement intensity has 
a deterrence effect on corporate tax evasion. Second, both central SOEs and local SOEs are 
more likely to evade taxes than non-SOEs, contrary to the common perception and the results 
in Bradshaw, Liao, and Ma (2016) and Jian, Li, and Zhang (2013). Third, the presence of a 
big audit firm helps reduce the likelihood of corporate tax evasion.  
 With regard to the detection model, we find three key results. First, as expected, the 
tax authority’s enforcement effort has a positive impact on tax evasion detection. Second, 
conditional on the firms that have committed a tax evasion, both central SOEs and local 
SOEs are less likely to be detected than non-SOEs. Third, tax evasion is more likely to be 
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detected when a firm employs a big audit firm. Overall, the results for the detection model are 
consistent with those for the commitment model. 
 To demonstrate the importance of adopting a bivariate probit model, we also run a 
simple probit model of tax evasion without considering the possibility of undetected tax 
evasion. We find that inferences change significantly using this simple probit model. For 
example, we no longer find evidence that SOEs or firms with a small audit firm are more 
likely to evade taxes or past tax enforcement intensity has a significant deterrence effect on 
corporate tax evasion.  
 To provide further support for the importance of ownership structure (SOEs vs. non-
SOEs) in tax enforcement, we also examine the impact of ownership structure on the 
magnitude of penalties for the detected tax evasions. We find that even if caught for tax 
evasion, SOEs are subject to smaller penalties than non-SOEs. Overall, this result along with 
the results from the commitment and detection models is consistent with the following 
hypotheses: (1) SOEs are more eager to evade taxes than non-SOEs; and (2) tax enforcement 
(including the monitoring of tax evasion and punishment for detected violations) are less 
severe for SOEs than for non-SOEs.   
 How can we reconcile the conflicting results for SOEs versus non-SOEs in this study 
and prior research (i.e., Bradshaw et al. 2016 and Jian et al. 2013)? There are two key 
differences between our study and these prior studies. First, we consider both income taxes 
and non-income taxes while these two studies examine income taxes only. Second, both 
Bradshaw et al. (2016) and Jian et al. (2013) use the commonly used effective income tax rate 
(ETR) in the tax literature to proxy for tax avoidance. While ETR reflects the effect of legal 
tax avoidance, it is less certain whether ETR can capture most aggressive (or illegal) forms of 
tax avoidance. Since we have both the frequency of detected tax evasion (EVASION) and the 
predicted probability of the unobservable tax evasion (EVASION*), we can directly assess the 
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correlations of these two tax evasion measures with ETR. We find that both tax evasion 
measures are positively correlated with ETR. Furthermore, we are also able to replicate the 
results of Bradshaw et al. (2016) using their ETR. These results suggest that the conventional 
tax avoidance proxy ETR may not be a reliable proxy for corporate tax evasion, the most 
aggressive form of tax avoidance.  
 We contribute to the tax literature in several important ways. First, we contribute to 
the literature on aggressive corporate tax avoidance. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) 
conceptualize corporate tax avoidance along a continuum that ranges from perfectly legal 
strategies (e.g., investment in tax exempt municipal bonds) at one extreme to illegal strategies 
such as tax evasion at the other. Due to lack of data, most existing tax research does not 
distinguish legal tax avoidance from illegal (or aggressive) tax avoidance. A noticeable 
exception is a few recent studies (e.g., Wilson 2009, Lisowsky 2010; Lisowsky, Robinson, 
and Schmidt 2013) that examine corporate tax shelters in the U.S., a relatively aggressive 
form of tax avoidance behavior. However, we wish to note that the tax shelters examined in 
these prior studies are not necessarily illegal. Using confidential tax audit adjustment data 
from China’s tax authorities, several studies (e.g., Chan and Mo 2000, Chan et al. 2010, Chan 
et al. 2016, Tang et al. 2017) examine firms’ tax noncompliance behavior in China.3 Our 
study differs from the afore-mentioned studies in several key aspects. The first difference is 
that we have access to all detected tax evasion cases, including both income tax evasions and 
non-income tax evasions, detected not only by the tax authorities but also by other third 
parties. The second difference is that we use a bivariate probit model to address the problem 
                                                          
3 Though not explicitly stated in the papers, after discussing with relevant Chinese tax administration officials, 
we believe the income tax audit adjustments used by Chan and Mo (2000), Chan et al. (2010), Chan et al. 
(2016), and Tang et al. (2017) are based on the immediate and routine income tax audit adjustments performed 
by the tax authority at the end of the year based on a firm’s submitted annual tax return and other supporting 
documents. This process is known as the settlement and payment process (Hui Suan Qing Jiao in Chinese). In 
contrast, the tax audit adjustments used in our study occur long after the settlement and payment process 
because the average time gap between the year of tax evasion and the year of restatement for the tax evasion is 
2.3 years. The long time gap also suggests that the tax evasions examined in our study are likely related to more 
severe tax law violations. 
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of unobservable tax evasion. The evidence from our study shows that taking into 
consideration undetected tax evasion could significantly alter a researcher’s inferences.   
Second, we contribute to a small but growing literature on corporate non-income tax 
avoidance (e.g., Robinson 2012; Hoopes, Thornock, Williams 2016) by considering both 
income tax and non-income tax evasion together. Non-income tax is a significant source of 
government revenue in many countries. More importantly, there could be a substitute or 
complementary relationship between income tax evasion and non-income tax evasion. Hence, 
omitting corporate non-income tax evasion from an analysis could significantly distort our 
understanding of many firms’ tax evasion behavior. 
 Third, we contribute to the literature on how tax enforcement affects corporate tax 
avoidance behavior. Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman (2012) show that stricter tax enforcement 
helps deter tax avoidance of publicly traded U.S. firms. Hoopes et al. use the cash ETR to 
proxy for tax avoidance. In contrast, we examine how tax enforcement affects corporate tax 
evasion. Moreover, we consider evasion of both income taxes and non-income taxes. We also 
use a bivariate probit model to address the problem of unobserved tax evasion. 
 Fourth, we extend the extant tax evasion literature, which is largely limited to U.S. 
firms, to China, a country with a weak institutional environment and rampant tax evasion. We 
show that Chinese SOEs are more likely than non-SOEs to not only evade taxes but also 
avoid detection of tax evasion. This finding is significant because there is a widely held belief 
that Chinese SOEs have no incentives to evade taxes simply because both the dividends and 
taxes paid by the SOEs belong to the government. Our finding is consistent with Tang et al. 
(2017) but opposite to those from Bradshaw et al. (2016) and Jian et al. (2013). An important 
contribution of our study is to reconcile these conflicting findings by highlighting the 
differences between legal tax avoidance from illegal or aggressive tax avoidance.    
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes our conceptual 
models of corporate tax evasion commitment and corporate tax evasion detection and 
introduces the proxies for each model construct. Section 3 introduces the bivariate probit 
model with partial observability. Section 4 discusses and sample selection procedures and 
data sources. Section 5 presents the regression results for the bivariate probit model and the 
common reduced form probit model of corporate tax evasion. Section 6 analyzes the 
determinants of tax evasion penalty and a reconciliation of our results with prior tax 
avoidance studies using ETR as a proxy. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
  We examine two interrelated research questions: (1) Why do publicly listed Chinese 
firms evade taxes (the commitment model)? (2) Limiting to the firms that have committed a 
tax evasion, which firms are more likely to be detected (the detection model)? We discuss the 
relevant explanatory variables and hypotheses for the commitment model in section 2.1 and 
the relevant explanatory variables and hypotheses for the detection model in section 2.2. 
 
2.1. The tax evasion commitment model 
 To examine the first research question, we adopt the following regression model (firm 
and year subscripts are omitted for brevity):  




effectsfixedindustryandyear
YOPPORTUNITABILITYMOTIVATIONEVASION 321*
                              (1) 
EVASION* is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm year experiences a tax evasion, and 
zero otherwise. Please note that EVASION* is observable only if detected. The choice of 
model (1)’s explanatory variables follows the popular motivation-ability-opportunity 
framework from the criminology literature (Cressey 1953; Braithwaite 1985; Fagan and 
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Freeman 1999; Vaughn 1999).4 According to this framework, a person’s decision to commit 
a crime depends on whether the person has a motive (e.g., what benefit can the person obtain 
from the act), the ability (e.g., did the person have a gun), and opportunity (e.g., was the 
person at the crime scene). Due to the multi-dimensional nature of the three theoretical 
constructs, we use multiple proxies for each construct (see appendix A for all variable 
definitions). However, we wish to note that some of the empirical proxies could represent 
more than one construct and therefore their coefficients should be interpreted with caution.  
 Below we discuss the prediction for each proxy. One important caveat we wish to 
highlight is that our predictions are based on existing tax avoidance research which does not 
make a clear distinction between legal tax avoidance from aggressive (or illegal) tax 
avoidance. Because of the fundamental differences between these two types of tax avoidance 
activities, there is a possibility that our predictions based on prior research may not exactly fit 
the case of tax evasion. 
 
2.1.1. Proxies for MOTIVATION 
 We use various proxies for MOTIVATION to assess the impact of firm incentives on 
tax evasion, including ownership structure (SOE_CENTRAL, SOE_LOCAL), capital structure 
(LEV, SEO), corporate tax rate (TAXRATE), and external product market’s competitive 
pressure (COMP).  
 The effect of government ownership (SOE_CENTRAL, SOE_LOCAL) on tax evasion 
is difficult to predict due to multiple countervailing institutional forces. On one hand, SOEs 
may be less aggressive than non-SOEs in tax evasion because both dividends to the SOE 
parent and taxes paid by the SOEs would eventually flow to the government’s coffers. 
Moreover, as the government’s ownership in the publicly listed SOEs is less than 100%, the 
                                                          
4 A similar framework is also adopted by studies of accounting frauds (Cooper, Dacin, and Palmer 2014; Davis 
and Pesch 2013; Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham 1989; Wolfe and Hermanson 2004). 
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controlling shareholder (i.e., the government) may have a stronger preference for taxes to 
dividends. This is because dividends have to be shared with minority shareholders while 
taxes accrue 100% to the government. In addition, both Bradshaw et al. (2016) and Jian et al. 
(2013) argue that SOE managers may have an incentive to pay more taxes in order to curry 
favor with government officials who have the ability to influence SOE managers’ promotion 
opportunities. Consistent with this prediction, both Bradshaw et al. (2016) and Jian et al. 
(2013) find that SOEs face higher effective tax rates (an inverse proxy for tax avoidance) 
than non-SOEs. However, neither examines tax evasion, the most extreme and more opaque 
form of tax avoidance. 
 On the other hand, there are also good reasons to believe that SOEs could be more 
aggressive in tax avoidance than non-SOEs. First, rather than a monolithic entity, the Chinese 
government is comprised of a large number of different and equally powerful government 
agencies with different and often conflicting incentives. For example, the Chinese SOEs are 
subject to the direct supervision of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) who may not share the same agenda as the tax authority. Similarly, 
since more than half of the taxes paid by an SOE are flown to the central government coffer, 
local government officials may not be eager to encourage the SOEs within their jurisdictions 
to pay more taxes (Tang et al. 2017). In addition, each publicly listed SOE has a controlling 
parent company who may have its own personal agenda different from the SASAC and the 
tax authority. Moreover, many Chinese SOEs are known for severe managerial agency 
problems, not only between the top executives and the ultimate controller SASAC but also 
between the top executives and their subsidiary managers. SOE managers and their 
subordinates often have an incentive to pursue empire building and therefore they should 
have a strong desire to reduce taxes in order to have more free cash flows at their disposal 
(e.g., Sun and Feng 2016).  
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 Second, SOEs have probably the strongest political connection with the government 
and therefore SOEs are always treated more favorably by government agencies. For this 
reason, SOEs are less afraid of being investigated for tax evasion. Even if caught with tax 
evasion, SOEs are less likely to be punished. In addition, an anonymous official from a local 
tax authority indicates that tax enforcers face a much smaller pressure to detect tax evasion in 
SOEs because after all both the SOEs and the tax authority are part of the government.  
 Third, the same anonymous tax official notes that SOEs have already shouldered 
many political and social responsibilities on behalf of the government and therefore the tax 
authority may find it much more difficult to strictly enforce the tax code on the SOEs. 
Because of these conflicting institutional forces, we do not make any predictions for the two 
ownership structure variables.    
 We use LEV and SEO to measure the impact of capital structure (financial leverage 
and pending equity financing, respectively) on tax evasion. Following Graham and Tucker’s 
(2006) argument for a substitution relation between leverage and non-debt tax shields, we 
predict a negative coefficient on LEV. We predict a negative coefficient on SEO because tax 
evasion, if detected by the securities regulator, would be treated as a red flag and therefore 
could jeopardize the capital raising effort of the firm (CSRC 2001, 2006).  
 We include TAXRATE because firms facing a higher tax rate could have a stronger 
incentive to evade taxes.5 Finally, we include COMP to capture the impact of product market 
competition on tax evasion. Kubick et al. (2015) find that firms with higher product market 
power are more tax aggressive because these firms are insulated from competitive threats. 
However, Cai and Liu (2009) find that firms in more competitive environments avoid more 
taxes, consistent with the interpretation that competitive forces provide firms with stronger 
                                                          
5 However, Yitzhaki (1974) argues that tax rate should have no impact on tax evasion if one assumes that the 
penalty for detected evasion is proportional to the tax understated. 
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incentives to avoid taxes. Because of the conflicting results from prior research, we do not 
make a prediction for the coefficient on COMP. 
 
2.1.2. Proxies for ABILITY 
 We use two proxies for ABILITY: SIZE and ROA. Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) 
find results consistent with economies of scale in tax planning such that larger firms invest 
more in tax planning. Manzon and Plesko (2002) argue that profitable firms can make more 
efficient use of tax deductions, credits, and exemptions relative to less proﬁtable firms, 
resulting in greater tax avoidance. Rego (2003) also finds consistent results such that larger, 
more profitable, and multinational corporations exhibit greater tax avoidance than other firms. 
Consistent with prior research, we expect both SIZE and ROA to be positively associated with 
tax evasion.  
 
2.1.3. Proxies for OPPORTUNITY 
 We use several proxies for OPPORTUNITY: external auditor quality (BIGN), tax 
enforcement intensity (TARGET_INDUS, AUDIT), and overall provincial law enforcement 
environment quality (LAW).  
 We do not make a prediction for the coefficient on BIGN due to conflicting 
institutional forces. On one hand, large audit firms could be more sophisticated tax planners 
and therefore they may be able to help their clients design more effective tax evasion 
strategies.6 Consistent with this argument, Treasury (1999) and U.S. Senate (2003) report that 
firms’ use of tax shelter promoters such as Big 5 auditors could be an indication of tax 
sheltering.  Consistent with Big 5 auditors being active tax shelter promoters, Lisowsky 
(2010) documents a positive association between the use of a Big Five auditor and tax shelter 
                                                          
6 Chinese laws do not prohibit audit firms from providing tax consulting services to their audit clients in our 
sample period. 
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use in a sample of firms between 2000 and 2004. Using a sample firms that subscribe to 
auditor-provided tax services, McGuire, Omer, and Wang (2012) find that auditors with 
stronger tax expertise can help their client firms achieve greater tax avoidance. 
 On the other hand, aggressive tax avoidance activities may also impose a significant 
business and regulatory risks to an audit firm (Chan et al. 2016) and therefore big audit firms 
who are more conscious about their reputation capital (Chan and Wu 2011) should have a 
stronger incentive to take actions to reduce such risks. Consistent with this argument, Chan et 
al. (2016) find that high-quality auditors are associated with client firms’ better tax 
compliance in China. Donohoe and Knechel (2014) find a positive association between tax 
aggressiveness and audit fees. Goh, Lim, Shevlin, and Zang (2014) find that the likelihood of 
auditor resignation is higher among firms that are more tax aggressive, consistent with 
auditors’ concerns with reputational and litigation risk related to their clients’ tax 
aggressiveness. Klassen, Lisowsky and Mescall (2016) find that clients of Big 4 tax preparers 
are associated with lower levels of tax avoidance when the tax preparer is also the auditor, 
compared to when the tax preparer is not the auditor. In addition, increased corporate 
reporting transparency resulting from a tougher auditor may also facilitate other stakeholders’ 
scrutiny of a firm’s questionable tax planning strategies, resulting in a reduction in a firm’s 
tax evasion activities.  
 We also examine how past tax enforcement intensity affects corporate tax evasion. 
While there is considerable uncertainty on whether corporate tax avoidance varies 
systematically with tax enforcement intensity, Hoopes et al. (2012) find that IRS audits deter 
corporate tax avoidance proxied by the cash ETR. Hence, we hypothesize that publicly listed 
Chinese firms are less likely to evade taxes if they are domiciled in provinces with tougher 
tax enforcement. Our tax enforcement intensity proxy is TARGET_INDUS, a dummy variable 
indicating the industries that are subject to stricter scrutiny by the tax authority in a year. The 
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second tax enforcement intensity is AUDIT, which measures the amount of tax revenues 
collected as a result of tax audits scaled by the total tax revenues collected in a province. To 
avoid potential endogeneity and consistent with Hoopes et al. (2012), we lag the two tax 
enforcement variables by one year relative to the dependent variable. Hoopes et al. (2012) 
show in the U.S. setting that that a substantial number of managers use historical data 
provided by the tax authority to gauge tax enforcement. In addition, as shown in Table 4 
below, the two tax enforcement variables are highly persistent over time.  
 Finally, we consider the impact of overall provincial law enforcement quality (LAW) 
on tax evasion. Consistent with the argument for the tax enforcement proxies, we predict the 
coefficient on LAW to be negative.  
 One may have noticed that our model (1) does not include the book-tax-difference (or 
other similar tax avoidance proxies) commonly used in prior tax avoidance literature. This is 
because our model (1) is a structural model that attempts to understand the causal drivers of 
tax evasion. On the other hand, the book-tax-difference is a consequence of corporate tax 
planning. While the book-tax-difference may be a useful indicator of tax evasion, but it is not 
a causal determinant of tax evasion. 
 
2.2. The tax evasion detection model 
 Conditional on the firms that have committed a tax evasion in a year, our second 
research question examines the types of firms that are more likely to be detected for tax 
evasion. Specifically, we adopt the following model (firm and year subscripts are omitted for 
brevity): 
  effectsfixedindustryandyearXEVASIONDETECTION *|                                  (2) 
DETECTION is a dummy variable that equals one if a tax evasion committed in year t is 
subsequently detected by the tax authority or others. It is important to note that model (2) is 
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tested using only the firms that have committed a tax evasion, regardless of whether a 
researcher can observe such tax evasion. Hence, explanatory variables that help identify tax 
evasion firms only are no longer needed and should be excluded from model (2). For example, 
LEV could causally affect the likelihood of tax evasion. However, since model (2) starts with 
the tax evasion firms, it is no longer necessary to include LEV in model (2) again, unless we 
argue that LEV also has a separate effect on detection. For the same reason, model (2) should 
not include the non-causal indicators for tax evasion proposed by the extant tax avoidance 
literature (e.g., the book-tax-difference). 
 We consider three sets of explanatory variables for model (2). First, we consider 
incentive factors that may facilitate or impede the detection of tax evasion, including 
ownership structure (SOE_CENTRAL and SOE_LOCAL), external audit quality (BIGN), local 
law enforcement environment quality (LAW), and effective tax rate (ETR). As argued in 
section 2.1, SOEs have a strong political connection with the government and therefore we 
expect the SOEs who have committed a tax evasion to be less likely detected. As argued in 
section 2.1, we expect big audit firms to deter their audit clients from committing tax evasion. 
However, even if audit clients do commit a tax evasion, the presence of a big audit firm may 
also help facilitate the tax authority’s or other monitors’ detection of such tax evasion due to 
more transparent information disclosure required by big audit firms. Similarly, we also expect 
the tax authority to find it easier to detect tax evasion in a stronger law enforcement 
environment (LAW). Finally, we include ETR as a proxy for public pressure because firms 
with low ETR tends to attract more public attention and therefore the tax authority may be 
under greater pressure to investigate such firms. 
 Second, we expect tax evasion detection to depend on the tax authority’s ex post 
enforcement effort, proxied by TARGET_INDUS, and AUDIT. Because tax audits are 
typically performed after the submission of a company’s tax return, all these enforcement 
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proxies are measured one year after the dependent variable. We predict the coefficients on all 
three variables to be positive. 
 Third, we include SIZE as a control variable for size related effects. In addition, we 
include year and industry fixed effects. 
 
3. Research method 
 One empirical challenge to estimating the models (1) and (2) is that EVASION* is not 
always observable and therefore models (1) and (2) cannot be estimated directly. Prior tax 
evasion studies simply ignore this problem and instead use a reduced form of model (1) by 
substituting the detected tax evasions for EVASION*. Since no one knows for sure the size of 
EVASION*, it remains unknown how severe the bias is resulting from using the reduced form 
model (1). In addition, to our knowledge, no study has estimated model (2) due to the partial 
observability of EVASION*. 
 In this study we address this partial observability problem by estimating models (1) 
and (2) simultaneously using the bivariate probit model with partial observability. 
Identification of the partial observability model requires the exclusion restriction for both 
models (Maddala 1983). Clearly, our models satisfy this condition. More importantly, as we 
show in the results section, there are at least one significant explanatory variable in one 
model that is excluded from the other model. 
 
4. Sample selection procedures and data sources 
Table 1 reports the sample selection procedures. We begin with an initial sample of 
11,981 firm-years for all publicly listed Chinese firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges from 2003 to 2010. We exclude financial firms due to their unique industry and 
regulatory differences. We start from 2003 because this is the first year when the CSMAR 
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database starts to collect the original texts of accounting error adjustments from annual 
reports that are used to determine tax evasion cases.7 The tax evasion data discussed in details 
below show that the time gap between the beginning year of a tax evasion case and the 
subsequent restatement year of the tax evasion is about 2.3 years, on average. Since we 
started the project in 2013, we end our sample in 2010 to avoid understating the disclosed tax 
evasion cases for the last few years of the sample period.  
We obtain firm-level financial data, including auditor and ownership information, from 
the CSMAR database. We obtain firm income tax rate data from the IFIND database, another 
major database on publicly listed Chinese companies. We exclude 1,804 observations with 
missing values for the variables used in the analysis, resulting in a sample of 10,177 
observations.  
Our empirical analyses also require relevant country and state-level variables. We 
collect the data on tax enforcement measures from the State Administration of Taxation and 
Tax Bureaus, and the data on legal enforcement from the National Economic Research 
Institute (NERI) (Fan, Wang, and Zhu 2011). 8 The requirement of non-missing country and 
state-level information further reduces the sample size to 8,886 observations.  
We identify the tax evasion firm years using the CSMAR database’s original texts of the 
accounting error adjustments as disclosed in annual reports for all the years since 2003. We 
also use the IFIND database as a supplemental source for accounting error adjustments that 
could have been missed by the CSMAR database. It is important to note that the tax 
adjustments considered in this study cover a variety of taxes, including corporate income 
taxes, value added taxes, consumption taxes, property taxes, stamp taxes, etc.  
                                                          
7 All publicly listed Chinese firms have been required to disclose accounting error adjustments, including tax 
adjustments, in their annual reports since 2002. 
8 The legal enforcement index, our measure of legal enforcement, is a sub-index of NERI indices, reflecting the 
strength of law enforcement for each province (Fan et al. 2011; Jian and Wong 2010; Wang et al. 2008).  
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From the accounting error adjustment disclosures, we manually identify the tax 
adjustments due to tax evasion between 2003 and 2010 using the following procedures. Our 
discussions with relevant corporate insiders and anonymous tax officials confirm that our 
sample selection procedures are reasonable to identify the tax evasion cases. First, we 
identify all the firm years involving tax adjustments. Second, we exclude the tax adjustments 
due to the following reasons unrelated to tax evasion: (i) tax adjustments due to the delayed 
approval or disapproval of tax deductions or exemptions by the relevant tax authorities (e.g., 
the recognition or derecognition of high-tech company status for tax purposes); (ii) routine 
year-end tax adjustments by the tax authority resulting from errors in estimated income taxes; 
and (iii) negative adjustments due to tax overpayment.9 Our final tax evasion sample contains 
339 firm-years for 178 unique firms over the period 2003-2010, representing 3.8% of the full 
sample in Table 1.  
Panel A of Table 2 shows the frequency of detected tax evasion by year in our sample 
period. Except for the last two years, the tax evasion percentage hovers around 4% each year. 
The significantly lower tax evasion percentages for the last two years could be due to the fact 
that it takes time for some tax evasion cases to be detected.  
 Panel B of Table 2 reports the frequency of detected tax evasion by tax type. While 
income tax evasions rank first in frequency (41.41%), we also observe significant tax 
evasions in value added tax, business tax, housing property tax, among others.   
Panel C of Table 3 shows the frequency of detected tax evasion by detector identity. 
While the majority of the detected tax evasions are uncovered by the tax authority, other 
stakeholders also played a significant role in detection.10 
                                                          
9 It is unlikely that the tax evasion cases in our final sample are due to financial reporting incentives. The reason 
is that financial reporting incentives would lead to higher taxable income and therefore higher taxes but our tax 
evasion cases are all about tax understatement. 
10 6.2% of the tax evasions reported in Panel C of Table 2 are classified as “self-disclosed”, which seems to 
suggest that the detector is the firm itself. However, several tax officials told us that most “self-disclosed” cases 
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5. Empirical results for the models of commitment and detection 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
 Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the regression variables included in models 
(1) and (2). During our sample period 4% of the firm years experienced detected tax evasions. 
This percentage seems high relative to the frequency of reported tax shelters in the U.S. For 
example, Lisowsky (2010) reported 267 tax shelters out of 9,223 firm years or 2.89%. 17% of 
our sample firms are central SOEs and 31% are local SOEs. Though not tabulated, the 
frequency of tax evasion is 3% for central SOEs and 4% for both local SOEs and non-SOEs. 
 Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for all the regression variables in 
models (1) and (2). As expected, the variables TARGET_INDUS, AUDIT, and LAW all 
exhibit persistence over time as evidenced by the significantly positive correlation for each 
variable in year t-1 and year t+1. In addition, the correlations are all very high except for 
TARGET_INDUS.  
 
5.2. Regression results 
5.2.1. The results for the commitment model 
 Table 5 reports the regression results of models (1) and (2) using the bivariate probit 
model that addresses the partial observability of tax evasion. We report the regression results 
of model (1) in column (1) and the regression results of model (2) in column (2).  
 Let’s focus on the regression results of model (1) first. We find support for using the 
motivation-ability-opportunity framework to explain tax evasion. With regard to 
MOTIVATION, the six proxies all load significantly except for TAXRATE. Specifically, we 
find that both central SOEs and local SOEs are more likely to evade taxes than non-SOEs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
are actually detected by tax authorities. To reduce the tax penalties for the firms, the tax authorities sometimes 
allow the firms to disclose the detector as “self-disclosed”.  
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This finding is opposite to those documented by Bradshaw et al. (2016) and Jian et al. (2013) 
using conventional tax avoidance proxies which tend to capture legal tax avoidance. Our 
results suggest that the drivers of illegal tax avoidance are fundamentally different from the 
drivers of legal tax avoidance. Contrary to our prediction, the coefficient on LEV is 
significantly positive. One potential interpretation of this positive coefficient is that highly 
levered firms may face a greater need for cash and therefore would have a stronger incentive 
to resort to aggressive tax avoidance behavior. As predicted, firms who plan to raise equity 
capital (SEO) are less likely to evade taxes. Interestingly, we find no evidence that a firm’s 
tax rate (TAXRATE) affects tax evasion, consistent with the prediction by Yitzhaki (1974) 
noted in footnote 1. Finally, firms in more competitive industries (COMP) are more likely to 
evade taxes, consistent with Cai and Liu (2009).  
 With regard to ABILITY, we find that SIZE is not significantly while ROA is 
significantly negative, contrary to our prediction. Similar to our ex post interpretation of LEV, 
one could argue that low ROA firms face a greater need for cash and therefore would have a 
stronger incentive to evade taxes (Edwards, Schwab, and Shevlin 2016; Law and Mills 2015). 
 With regard to OPPORTUNITY, we find that three of the four proxies are significant 
and as predicted. Specifically, there is evidence that firms with a big audit firm (BIGN) are 
less likely to evade taxes. The coefficient on AUDIT is significantly negative, suggesting that 
firms operating in regions with tougher tax enforcement are less likely to evade taxes. We 
also find evidence that firms domiciled in stronger legal enforcement regions (LAW) are less 
likely to evade taxes. 
 
5.2.2. The results for the detection model 
 Column (2) of Table 5 shows the regression results of the detection model estimated 
using the bivariate probit model. We find that both incentives and effort matter in tax evasion 
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detection. Specifically, we find that conditional on the firms that have committed a tax 
evasion, both central and local SOEs are less likely to be detected for tax evasion. Firms with 
big audit firms (BIGN) or domiciled in stronger legal enforcement environments (LAW) are 
more likely to be detected for tax evasion. Both tax enforcement effort proxies 
(TARGET_INDUS and AUDIT) are significantly positive, suggesting that tax evasions are 
more likely to be detected when the tax authority’s enforcement effort is greater. 
 
5.2.3. The results for the reduced form commitment model 
 Prior tax evasion research models corporate tax evasion using only the detected tax 
evasion cases, referred to as the reduced form commitment model. Hence, a natural question 
we would like to ask is whether there are significant differences in inference using the 
reduced form commitment model versus the bivariate probit model. Column (3) of Table 5 
reports the regression results of model (1) where the dependent variable is one if there is a 
detected tax evasion and zero otherwise. Compared with the coefficients on the same 
variables in column (1) of Table 5, we notice that the previously significant coefficients on 
SOE_CENTRAL, SOE_LOCAL, BIGN, and AUDIT in column (1) are no longer significant in 
column (3). These results suggest that we would have drawn substantially different inferences 
about tax evasion determinants had we used the simple reduced form model.  
   
6. Further analyses 
 One most striking finding from Table 5 that is significantly different from prior 
research is that SOEs are not only more likely to evade taxes but also they are less likely to 
be detected for tax evasion. In this section, we provide further evidence consistent with this 
finding in section 6.1. In addition, we also attempt to directly reconcile our results for the 
ownership structure variables with those from prior research in section 6.2. 
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6.1. Tax evasion penalties 
 If both SOEs and non-SOEs are caught with tax evasion, which firms are punished 
more severely? The arguments in section 2 would predict SOEs to be less severely punished 
because they have the superior political connection with the government. Table 6 shows the 
OLS regression results for this prediction using only the firm years that have reported a tax 
evasion. Because we use fewer control variables in Table 6, the number of tax evasion 
observations is bigger than that in Table 1. The dependent variable is PENALTY, defined as 
the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of tax penalties levied on a firm for committing 
a tax evasion in year t. Our key variables of interest are SOE_CENTRAL and SOE_LOCAL. 
We include SIZE, the severity of the tax evasion (EVADEDTAX), dummies for the type of 
taxes evaded, dummies for the tax evasion detectors, and year and industry fixed effects as 
controls. See appendix A for all variable definitions. Consistent with our prediction, the 
coefficients on SOE_CENTRAL and SOE_LOCAL are significantly negative.  
  
6.2. Reconciliation with prior tax avoidance literature 
 Both Bradshaw et al. (2016) and Jian et al. (2013) find that SOEs are less likely to 
avoid taxes than non-SOEs, contrary to our results in Table 5. How can we reconcile these 
conflicting results? Our study differs from these two studies in two key aspects. First, we 
consider both income taxes and non-income taxes whereas these two studies consider income 
taxes only. Second, these two studies use the effective income tax rate (ETR) as a proxy for 
tax avoidance while we use tax evasion. Because the effective tax rate could reflect the 
effects of both legal tax avoidance and some aggressive (or illegal) tax avoidance, the 
effective tax rate is not comparable to our tax evasion measure.  
 22 
 
 To check the correlation between common tax avoidance measures and our tax 
evasion proxy, Table 7 tabulates the summary statistics (panel A) and pairwise Pearson 
correlations (panel B) of the following variables for the full sample as well as the three 
subsamples (central SOEs, local SOEs, and non-SOEs): EVASION (the detected tax evasion), 
PRED_EVASION (the predicted tax evasion probability based on the commitment model in 
column (1) of Table 5), ETR, and CashETR (per Bradshaw et al. 2016). See appendix A for 
detailed definitions. There are two key findings. First, the predicted tax evasion frequencies 
are much higher than the observed tax evasion frequencies for both central and local SOEs. 
Second, the associations between PRED_EVASION and ETR (or CashETR) are all non-
negative, suggesting that neither ETR nor CashETR is a good proxy for tax evasion.  
 We next replicate the ETR model from Bradshaw et al. (2016) over our sample period 
2003-2010. Results are similar if we use CashETR as the dependent variable (untabulated). 
As shown in column (1) of Table 8, the coefficient on SOE is significantly positive, 
consistent with Bradshaw et al. (2016). In column (2), we break down SOE into central- and 
local- government owned (SOE_CENTRAL and SOE_LOCAL) and the results are also 
consistent with those reported in Bradshaw et al. (2016). Finally, we estimate the ETR model 
using the same set of control variables in Table 5 and we continue to find similar results (see 
columns (3) and (4)). Overall, these multivariate results provide further evidence that caution 
should be exercised in using ETR or CashETR as a proxy for aggressive tax avoidance 
behavior. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 Taking advantage of the mandatory disclosure of detected corporate tax evasions in 
China, we examine why publicly listed Chinese firms evade taxes. To deal with the partial 
observability of corporate tax evasion, we simultaneously model the determinants of 
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corporate tax evasion (referred to as the commitment model) and the determinants of 
corporate tax evasion detection conditional on the occurrence of a tax evasion (referred to as 
the detection model) using a bivariate probit model. Unlike most prior research that focuses 
on corporate income tax avoidance only, we consider both income tax evasion and non-
income tax evasion together. 
 With regard to the commitment model, we find three interesting results. First, ex ante 
tax enforcement intensity has a deterrence effect on corporate tax evasion. Second, SOEs are 
more likely to evade taxes than non-SOEs. Third, the presence of a big audit firm is 
associated with a reduced likelihood of corporate tax evasion. With regard to the detection 
model, we find the following interesting results. First, as expected, the tax authority’s 
enforcement effort has a positive impact on tax evasion detection. Second, SOEs are less 
likely to be detected for tax evasion than non-SOEs. Corporate tax evasion is more likely to 
be detected when a firm employs a big audit firm. Consistent with the results from the 
commitment model, we also find that even if caught for tax evasion, SOEs are subject to 
smaller penalties than non-SOEs. 
 Overall, our results are inconsistent with Brandshaw et al. (2016) and Jian et al. (2013) 
who find SOEs to be less likely to avoid taxes than non-SOEs. A key difference between 
these two studies and ours is the definition of tax avoidance. Specifically, we focus on tax 
evasion, the most opaque and egregious form of tax avoidance, but both Brandshaw et al. 
(2016) and Jian et al. (2013) use the effective tax rate (ETR) as a proxy for tax avoidance. 
While ETR can capture the effect of legal tax avoidance, it is less clear whether ETR can 
capture most egregious forms of tax avoidance. Another key difference is that we consider 
both income taxes and non-income taxes while these two studies examine income taxes only. 
We find that our tax evasion measure is positively correlated with ETR, suggesting that the 
conventional ETR may not be a reliable proxy for corporate tax evasion. 
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 We contribute to the existing tax literature in several important ways. First, we 
contribute to the literature on aggressive corporate tax avoidance by being the first study to 
use a bivariate probit model to simultaneously model the determinants of partially observable 
tax evasion and the determinants of tax evasion detection. We show that taking into 
consideration undetected tax evasion could significantly alter a researcher’s inferences. 
Second, we contribute to a small but growing literature on corporate non-income tax 
avoidance by considering both income tax evasion and non-income tax evasion together. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on how tax enforcement affects corporate tax avoidance 
behavior. To our best knowledge, we are the first study to examine how tax enforcement 
affects corporate tax evasion. Fourth, we extend the extant tax evasion literature, which is 
largely limited to U.S. firms, to China, a country with a weak institutional environment and 
rampant tax evasion. We show that Chinese SOEs are more likely than non-SOEs to not only 
evade taxes but also avoid detection of tax evasion.  
 25 
 
  References 
Bauer, A., and K. Klassen. 2014. Estimating Downside Tax Risk Using Large Unfavorable Tax 
Payments. Working paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and University of Waterloo. 
 
Blouin, J., C. Gleason, L. Mills, S. Sikes. 2010. Pre-Empting Disclosure? Firms’ Decisions Prior to 
FIN No. 48, The Accounting Review 85: 791-815. 
 
Bradshaw, M., G. Liao, and S. Ma. 2016. Ownership Structure and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from 
Agency Cost of State Ownership in China. Working paper, Boston College, Central University of 
Finance and Economics, and American University. 
 
Braithwaite, J. 1985. White Collar Crime. Annual Review of Sociology 11: 1-25. 
 
Cai, H, and Q. Liu. 2009. Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Chinese 
Industrial Firms. The Economic Journal. April 2009 (London). 
 
Chan, K. H., K. Z. Lin, and P. Mo. 2010. Will a Departure from Tax-Based Accounting Encourage 
Tax Noncompliance? Archival Evidence from a Transition Economy. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 50 (1), 58-73. 
 
Chan, K. H., R. Luo, and P. Mo. 2016. Auditors’ Constraining Effect on Tax Noncompliance at 
Different Book-Tax Conformity Levels in a Transition Economy. Journal of International Accounting 
Research 15(3), 1-30. 
 
Chan, K.H. and P. Mo. 2000. Tax Holidays and Tax Noncompliance: An Empirical Study of 
Corporate Tax Audits in China’s Developing Economy. The Accounting Review 75:469–484.  
 
Chan, K.H. and D. Wu. 2011. Aggregate quasi rents and auditor independence: Evidence from audit 
firm mergers in China. Contemporary Accounting Research 28: 175-213. 
 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 2001. Measures for the Administration of the 
Listed Company Issuing New Shares, issued on March 28, 2001.  
 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 2006. Administrative Measures for the Issuance of 
Securities by Listed Companies, issued on May 8, 2006. 
 
Cressey, D. R. 1953. Other People’s Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement. 
New York: Free Press.  
 
Cooper, D. T. Dacin, and D. Palmer. 2014. Fraud in Accounting, Organizations and Society: 
Extending the Boundaries of Research. Accounting, Organization and Society 38: 440-457. 
 
Davis, J. and H. Pesch. 2013. Fraud Dynamics and Controls in Organizations. Accounting, 
Organization and Society 38: 469-483. 
 
Donohoe, M. P. and Robert Knechel, W. 2014. Does Corporate Tax Aggressiveness Influence Audit 
Pricing?. Contemporary Account Research, 31: 284–308. 
 
Dyreng, S., M. Hanlon, E. Maydew, and J. Thornock. 2016. Changes in Corporate Effective Tax 
Rates over the Past Twenty-Five Years. Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming. 
 
Edwards, A., C. Schwab, and T. Shevlin. 2016. Financial Constraints and Cash Tax Savings. The 
Accounting Review 91: 859-881. 
 
 26 
 
Fagan, J. and R. Freeman. 1999. Crime and Work. Crime and Justice 25: 225-290. 
 
Fan, G., X. Wang, X., and H. P. Zhu. 2011. NERI Index of Marketization of China’ Provinces 2011 
Report. Economics Science Press, Beijing.  
 
Feldstein, M. 1999. Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax. The Review of 
Economic and Statistics 81: 674-680. 
 
Feldstein, M. 2008. Effects of Taxes on Economic Behavior. National Tax Journal 61: 131-139.  
 
Fisman, R., Wei, S.J., 2004. Tax Rates and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from ‘‘Missing Imports’’ in 
China, Journal of Political Economy 112(2), 471–96. 
 
Gleason, C. and L. Mills. 2002. Materiality and Contingent Tax Liability Reporting. The Accounting 
Review 77: 317-342. 
 
Goh, C. Lim, T. Shevlin, and Zang, Y., B.. 2014. Tax Aggressiveness and Auditor Resignation. 
Working paper, Singapore Management University and University of California at Irvine. 
 
Graham, J. and A. Tucker. 2006. Tax Shelters and Corporate Debt Policy. Journal of Financial 
Economics 81: 563-594. 
 
Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman. 2010. A Review of Tax Research. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 50: 127-178. 
 
Hoopes, J., D. Mescall, and J. Pittman. 2012. Do IRS Audit Deter Corporate Tax Avoidance? The 
Accounting Review 87: 1603-1639. 
 
Hoopes, J., J. Thornock, and B. Williams. 20 16. Does Use Tax Evasion Provide a Competitive 
Advantage to E-Tailers? National Tax Journal 69: 133-168. 
 
Internal Revenue Service. 2016. Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2008–2010. IRS Publications. 
 
Jian, M., W. Li, and H. Zhang. 2013. How Does State Ownership Affect Tax Avoidance: Evidence 
from China. Working paper. Nanyang Technological University and Fuzhou University. 
 
Jian, M. and T.J. Wong. 2010. Propping Through Related Party Transactions. Review of Accounting 
Studies 15: 70-105.  
 
Klassen, K., P. Lisowsky, and D. Mescall. 2016. The Role of Auditors, Non-Auditors, and Internal 
Tax Departments in Corporate Tax Aggressiveness. The Accounting Review 91: 179-205. 
 
Kubick, T., D. Lynch, M. Mayberry, and T. Omer. 2015. Product Market Power and Tax Avoidance: 
Market Leaders, Mimicking Strategies, and Stock Returns. The Accounting Review 90: 675-702. 
 
Law, K. and L. Mills. 2015. Taxes and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Linguistic Cues. Journal 
of Accounting Research 53: 777-819. 
 
Lisowsky, P. 2010. Seeking Shelter: Empirically Modeling Tax Shelters Using Financial Statement 
Information. The Accounting Review 85: 1693-1720.  
 
Lisowsky, P., L. Robinson, and A. Schmidt. 2013. Do Publicly Disclosed Tax Reserves Tell Us About 
Privately Disclosed Tax Shelter Activity? Journal of Accounting Research 51: 583-629. 
 
 27 
 
Loebbecke, J., M. Eining, and J. Willingham. 1989. Auditors’ Experience with Material Irregularities: 
Frequency, Nature, and Detectability. Auditing 9: 1-28. 
 
Maddala, G. S. 1983. Limited-dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
McGuire., S., T. Omer, and D. Wang. 2012. Tax Avoidance: Does Tax-Specific Industry Expertise 
Make a Difference? The Accounting Review 87: 975-1003. 
 
Mills, L., M. Erickson, and E. Maydew. 1998. Investments in Tax Planning. Journal of the American 
Taxation Association 20: 1-20. 
 
Manzon, G. and G. Plesko. 2002. The Relation Between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of 
Income. Tax Law Review 55: 175-214. 
 
Rego. 2003. Tax-Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 20: 805-833. 
 
Slemrod, J. 2007. Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 21: 25-48. 
 
National Audit Office. 2015. Tackling Tax Fraud: How HMRC Responds to Tax Evasion, the Hidden 
Economy and Criminal Attacks. Report by the Comptroller and Audit General. 
 
Robinson, L. 2012. Corporate Non-Income-Tax Avoidance. Working paper. Dartmouth College. 
 
Sun Lizhao and Coco Feng. 2016. China Rail Giant Punishes Unit for Global Misconduct. Caixin 
online magazine, December 28, 2016. 
 
Tang, T., P. L. L. Mo, and K. H. Chan. 2017. Tax Collector or Tax Avoider? An investigation of 
Intergovernmental Agency Conflicts. The Accounting Review (forthcoming). 
 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1999. The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters, Discussion, Analysis 
and Legislative Proposals. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office. 
 
U.S. Senate, 2003. U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial 
Professionals. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office. 
 
Vaughan, D. 1999. The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistakes, Misconduct, and Disaster. Annual 
Review of Sociology 25: 271-305. 
 
Wang, Q., T.J. Wong, and L. Xia. 2008. State Ownership, the Institutional Environment, and Auditor 
Choice: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Economics 46: 112-134.  
 
Wilson, R. 2009. An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants. The Accounting Review 84:  
969-99. 
 
Wolfe, D. and D. Hermanson. 2004. The Fraud Diamond: Considering the Four Elements of Fraud. 
The CPA Journal 74: 38-42. 
 
Yitzhaki, S. 1974. A note on 'income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis, Journal of Public Economics 
3(2): 201-202. 
 
 
 28 
 
Appendix. Variable Definitions 
Variable name Definition 
EVASION* An indicator variable that equals one if a firm commits a tax 
evasion (regardless of whether the evasion is detected or not) in 
year t, and zero otherwise. 
EVASION An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is caught with a 
tax evasion in year t, and zero otherwise. 
PRED_EVASION The predicted value of the partially observable EVASION* based 
on the the bivariate probit model. 
SOE_CENTRAL A dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s ultimate 
controller is the central government, and zero otherwise. 
SOE_LOCAL A dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s ultimate 
controller is a local government, and zero otherwise. 
LEV Long-term debt scaled by total assets. 
SEO A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a seasoned equity 
offering between year t and year t+2. 
TAXRATE The statutory income tax rate disclosed by the firm in a year. 
COMP The Herfindahl index of sales in different industries, where 
higher value means lower level of competition. 
SIZE The natural log of total assets.  
ROA Pre-tax income divided by total assets. 
BIGN An indicator variable that equals 1 if the company is audited by a 
Big 4 firm or one of the Top 10 domestic audit firms in China in 
a year, according to the audit revenue data compiled by The 
Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and zero 
otherwise. 
TARGET_INDUS An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm year belongs to one 
of the industries that are under stricter scrutiny by the tax 
authority, and zero otherwise. 
AUDIT The tax revenue collected through tax audit as a percentage of 
total tax revenue for each province year. 
LAW 
 
 
 
The law enforcement index developed by Fan et al. (2011). Each 
province receives an index value between 0-10 based on the 
province’s law enforcement strength, with larger value of index 
indicates better enforcement. 
ETR Tax expense divided by pre-tax book income. Observations with 
negative pre-tax book income is set to missing. This variable is 
truncated at 0 and 1. 
PENALTY the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of penalty levied on 
the firm for tax evasion committed in year t 
EVADEDTAX the natural logarithm of the amount of evaded tax for the tax 
evasion committed in year t 
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
No. of firm-year 
Observations 
A-share companies between 2003 to 2010 in CSMAR 11,981 
     Less: observations with missing firm-level variables (1,804) 
 10,177 
     Less: observations with missing country and state-level variables (1,291) 
Final sample  8,886 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Detected Tax Evasions 
Panel A. Distribution of detected tax evasions by commitment year 
Commitment year  Tax evasion observations Percent of all firms in the year 
2003 49 5.93 
2004 50 5.79 
2005 39 4.44 
2006 46 4.83 
2007 52 4.13 
2008 38 3.09 
2009 38 2.80 
2010 27 1.78 
Total 339 3.81 
 
Panel B. Distribution of detected tax evasions by tax type 
Tax type  Percent of tax evasion firm-years* 
Enterprise Income Tax   41.41 
Value Added Tax  18.35 
Business Tax  13.65 
Housing Property Tax  12.00 
Urban Land Use Tax  10.59 
Tax for Maintaining and Building Cities  6.82 
Stamp Tax  6.82 
Education Supplementary Tax  6.12 
Land Value Added Tax  3.76 
Vehicle Usage Tax  1.41 
Tariff  1.18 
Tax Rebate  0.47 
Consumption Tax   0.23 
Others  22.59 
*Do not add up to 100% because a tax evasion firm year may involves more than one type of taxes evaded. 
 
Panel C. Distribution of detected tax evasions by detectors 
Detector  Percent of tax evasion firm-years* 
Central Tax Bureau (State Administration of Taxation )  16.47 
Local Tax Bureau   20.71 
Local or Central Tax Bureau  18.82 
Ministry of Finance  7.53 
Self-Disclosed  6.12 
Department of Audit  4.00 
The Customs  0.94 
SEC   0.71 
Unknown  30.58 
*Do not add up to 100% because a tax evasion firm year may involves more than one detecting agencies. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Regression Variables 
 
Variable N mean SD p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
         
DETECTt 8,886 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SIZEt 8,886 21.53 1.16 20.22 20.75 21.41 22.16 23.01 
ROAt 8,886 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.13 
TAXRATEt-1 8,886 0.22 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.33 0.33 
LEVt-1 8,886 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.22 
SEOt 8,886 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
BIGNt 8,886 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SOE_CENTRALt 8,886 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
SOE_LOCALt 8,886 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
COMPt-1 8,886 0.13 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.30 
AUDITt-1 8,886 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
AUDITt+1 8,886 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
LAWt-1 8,886 8.07 4.49 3.69 4.70 6.61 10.64 14.23 
LAWt+1 8,886 8.84 4.91 3.96 5.11 7.32 12.39 16.61 
TARGET_INDUSt-1 8,886 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
TARGET_INDUSt+1 8,886 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ETRt 8,886 0.22 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.19 0.29 0.39 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis. See the appendix for variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Table 4. Pearson Correlations 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis. Shaded cells indicate correlation coefficients that are statistically different from zero at the 10% 
level. See the appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 
1. DETECTt 1.00                 
2. SIZEt -0.03 1.00                
3. ROAt -0.05 0.19 1.00               
4. TAXRATEt–1 0.03 0.00 -0.05 1.00              
5. LEVt–1 0.03 0.34 -0.04 0.06 1.00             
6. SEOt -0.03 0.17 0.13 -0.03 0.11 1.00            
7. BIGNt -0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.00 0.05 1.00           
8. SOE_CENTRALt -0.01 0.18 0.01 -0.11 0.06 0.03 0.11 1.00          
9. SOE_LOCALt 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.30 1.00         
10. COMPt–1 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.05 1.00        
11. AUDITt–1 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.02 1.00       
12. AUDITt+1 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.99 1.00      
13. LAWt–1 -0.09 0.18 0.12 -0.13 -0.05 0.08 0.21 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.25 -0.25 1.00     
14. LAWt+1 -0.08 0.17 0.12 -0.13 -0.08 0.07 0.22 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.25 -0.25 0.98 1.00    
15. TARGET_INDUSt–1 0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 0.10 0.09 1.00   
16. TARGET_INDUSt+1 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 0.10 0.09 0.41 1.00  
17. ETRt 0.03 0.03 -0.16 0.33 0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.08 1.00 
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Table 5. Determinants of Corporate Tax Evasion Commitment and Detection 
 (1) (2)  (3)   
 Bivariate Probit with Partial Observability  Probit   
 Pr(Evasion*t) Pr(Detection | Evasion*t)  Pr(Evasiont)   
       
SIZEt -0.0093 -0.0863  -0.0595**   
 (-0.13) (-0.69)  (-2.15)   
ROAt -2.6011***   -2.4860***   
 (-3.37)   (-4.08)   
TAXRATEt–1 0.2825   0.2320   
 (0.87)   (0.72)   
LEVt–1 0.6303**   0.6669**   
 (2.17)   (2.54)   
SEOt -0.1370*   -0.1324**   
 (-1.83)   (-1.97)   
BigNt -0.2832* 0.6153**  -0.0228   
 (-1.89) (2.49)  (-0.38)   
SOE_CENTRALt 1.0138** -2.1738***  -0.0618   
 (2.11) (-3.22)  (-0.79)   
SOE_LOCALt 0.7298** -1.6083***  0.0322   
 (2.34) (-2.95)  (0.56)   
COMPt–1 -0.3625*   -0.3924**   
 (-1.75)   (-2.03)   
AUDITt–1 -12.1344*   2.1078   
 (-1.68)   (0.70)   
LAWt–1 -0.1024***   -0.0520***   
 (-4.74)   (-5.88)   
TARGET_INDUSt–1 -0.0087   0.1148   
 (-0.10)   (1.40)   
ETRt  0.0014  0.1516   
  (0.00)  (0.99)   
AUDITt+1  39.6108***     
  (2.83)     
LAWt+1  0.1090***     
  (2.83)     
TARGET_INDUSt+1  0.5505**     
  (1.97)     
Year & Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes  
 
Yes 
  
Log Likelihood -1341.15  -1365.17   
Prob > χ2 0.00  0.00   
Observations 8,886  8,886   
Pseudo R2 -  0.05   
      
See the appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. The t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
adjusted for firm clustering. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 6. OLS Regression Results on the Determinants of Tax Evasion Penalty 
 Dependent variable = PENALTYt 
  
SIZEt 0.04589 
 (0.23) 
SOE_CENTRALt -1.9424*** 
 (-4.04) 
SOE_LOCALt -1.0590* 
 (-1.83) 
EVADEDTAX 0.6722*** 
 (4.80) 
Constant -9.035* 
 (-1.89) 
  
Dummies for Types of Evaded Taxes Yes  
Dummies for Detectors Yes  
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 425 
Adjusted R2 0.26 
  
See the appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. A Comparison of Tax Evasion, Predicted Tax Evasion, and Effective Tax Rates  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
             
 Full Sample Central SOEs Local SOEs Non-SOEs 
     
Variable Mean SD Med Mean SD Med Mean SD Med Mean SD Med 
             
EVASIONt 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 
PRED_EVASIONt 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.23 0.12 0.23 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.06 0.04 0.05 
ETRt 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.16 
CashETRt 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.14 
             
 
Panel B: Pearson Correlations 
 
Variable EVASIONt PRED_EVASIONt ETRt 
    
Full Sample    
PRED_EVASIONt 0.047 (0.00)   
ETRt 0.036 (0.00) 0.015 (0.29)  
CashETRt 0.038 (0.00) 0.026 (0.02) 0.609 (0.00) 
    
Central SOEs    
PRED_EVASIONt 0.040 (0.02)   
ETRt 0.055 (0.03) 0.009 (0.73)  
CashETRt 0.077 (0.00) 0.016 (0.54) 0.660 (0.00) 
    
Local SOEs    
PRED_EVASIONt 0.061 (0.00)   
ETRt 0.015 (0.44) 0.050 (0.01)  
CashETRt 0.006 (0.76) 0.055 (0.01) 0.587 (0.00) 
    
Non-SOEs    
PRED_EVASIONt 0.133 (0.00)   
ETRt 0.041 (0.01) 0.107 (0.00)  
CashETRt 0.045 (0.00) 0.075 (0.00) 0.607 (0.00) 
    
This table presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for tax evasion incidents, predicted tax 
evasion, ETR, and Cash ETR. P-values (based on two-tailed tests) for correlations are in parentheses. See the 
appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 8. Replication of Bradshaw et al.’s (2016) ETR Regression 
 
 Dependent variable = ETRt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
SOEt 0.0135**  0.0084**  
 (2.52)  (2.27)  
SOE_CENTRALt  0.0051  0.0067* 
  (1.33)  (1.80) 
SOE_LOCALt  0.0138***  0.0105*** 
  (3.84)  (3.01) 
SIZEt -0.0021 -0.0030 0.0017 0.0024 
 (-0.85) (-1.61) (1.03) (1.60) 
ROAt 0.4163*** 0.4090*** -0.0628** -0.0463 
 (13.80) (16.32) (-2.04) (-1.32) 
LEVt -0.0028*** -0.0027*** 0.0287** 0.0294** 
 (-5.43) (-5.45) (2.56) (2.37) 
MBt 0.0411*** 0.0358***   
 (2.70) (3.03)   
CAPEXt -0.1952*** -0.1030***   
 (-5.83) (-3.79)   
NOLt -0.0983*** -0.0962***   
 (-10.64) (-11.95)   
M&At 0.0019 0.0035   
 (0.50) (0.94)   
EQUOFFERt -0.0164*** -0.0144***   
 (-3.81) (-3.56)   
CROSSLISTt -0.0017 0.0009   
 (-0.18) (0.12)   
OWNCONCENt -0.0278* -0.0270**   
 (-1.70) (-2.31)   
MGMTOWNt -0.0036 -0.0050   
 (-0.74) (-1.40)   
DUALCEOt -0.0054 -0.0045   
 (-0.75) (-0.90)   
TAXPREFERENCEt -0.0770*** -0.0673***   
 (-16.27) (-18.70)   
TAXRATEt–1   0.5973*** 0.5291*** 
   (29.29) (24.44) 
SEOt   0.0070 0.0169 
   (0.63) (1.16) 
BigNt   -0.0304*** -0.0269*** 
   (-7.77) (-8.09) 
COMPt–1   -0.0113*** -0.0048 
   (-3.12) (-1.34) 
AUDITt–1   0.2231 0.4207** 
   (1.12) (2.18) 
LAWt–1   -0.0001 0.0006 
   (-0.16) (1.35) 
TARGET_INDUSt–1   0.0340*** 0.0219*** 
   (6.52) (3.19) 
Constant 0.2856*** 0.3997*** 0.0430 0.0429 
 (5.63) (7.73) (1.30) (1.13) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,856 7,856 8,873 8,873 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.13 
This table reports the OLS estimation results of Bradshaw et al.’s (2016) ETR model over our sample period. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for 
firm clustering. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. SOE 
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is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is controlled by the state, and zero otherwise. MB is the market to 
book ratio, defined as the sum of market value of equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of 
equity at the end of the year. CAPEX is capital expenditure divided by total assets at the end of the year. NOL is 
the accumulated pre-tax losses reported in the prior five years. NOL is set to 0 if the accumulated earnings in the 
prior five years are positive. M&A is an indicator variable for merger and acquisitions in the current year. 
EQUOFFER is an indicator variable for seasonal equity offerings in a year. CROSSLIST is an indicator variable 
for firms that are also cross-listed in both A-share and H-Share stock markets. MGMTOWN is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the management has equity ownership, and 0 otherwise. OWNCONCEN is the 
ownership percentage of the largest shareholder. DUALCEO is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is 
also the chairman of the board of directors, and zero otherwise. TAXPREFERENCE is an indicator variable for 
firms that potentially enjoy a preferential tax rate. Three major types of firms enjoy preferential tax rates: 1) 
firms domiciled in special locations, including hi-tech industry development zones and economic development 
zones (that sometimes receive preferential tax rates); 2) firm-years with foreign ownership (that are eligible for 
preferential tax rates); 3) observations of firms younger than three years (that receive special deductions for 
start-up expenses). We exclude R&D (research and development expense divided by total assets) and 
FORESALE (The percentage of foreign sales to total sales) included in Bradshaw et al.’s model because these 
two variables require hand collection. See the appendix for all other variable definitions. 
  
 
